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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3118 
___________ 
 
KHARY JAMAL ANCRUM, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
RONNIE HOLT 
____________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3:11-cv-01420) 
District Judge:  Honorable Richard P. Conaboy 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
November 16, 2012 
 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 4, 2012) 
_________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Khary Ancrum, a federal inmate presently confined at USP Canaan in Waymart, 
Pennsylvania and proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States District 
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissing his habeas corpus petition 
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  Because this appeal does not present a substantial 
question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; 
I.O.P. 10.6. 
 Because we primarily write for the parties, we need only recite the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  After a disciplinary hearing, Ancrum was found guilty of a violation 
of Code 113—Possession of Any Narcotics Not Prescribed for the Individual by Medical 
Staff.  The Disciplinary Hearing Officer (“DHO”) sanctioned Ancrum with the loss of 
forty days of good conduct time; sixty days of disciplinary segregation; loss of visiting 
privileges for four years followed by four years of restricted visiting; loss of commissary 
privileges for two years; impound of personal property for two years; and loss of 
telephone and email privileges for three years. 
 After exhausting his administrative remedies, Ancrum filed his § 2241 petition on 
July 27, 2011.  In his petition, Ancrum claims that the DHO violated his procedural due 
process rights by not discussing in his report the reliability of confidential inmate witness 
statements used to find him guilty of the violation.  On May 14, 2012, a Magistrate Judge 
issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), recommending that Ancrum’s petition 
be dismissed.  On July 16, 2012, the District Court adopted the R&R and dismissed 
Ancrum’s petition.  Specifically, the District Court noted that Ancrum received the 
minimum due process required when a DHO relies upon testimony from confidential 
informants.  Ancrum then timely filed this appeal. 
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 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), and “exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous 
standard to its findings of fact.”  O’Donald v. Johns, 402 F.3d 172, 173 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(per curiam); see also United States v. Friedland, 83 F.3d 1532, 1542 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(“Our review of the district court’s order denying . . . relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is 
plenary.”).  Section 2241 is the appropriate vehicle for constitutional claims when a 
prison disciplinary proceeding results in the loss of good time credits, Queen v. Miner, 
530 F.3d 253, 254 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), and a certificate of appealability is not 
required to appeal the denial of a § 2241 petition, Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 146 
(3d Cir. 2009).  We may summarily affirm on any basis supported by the record.  Murray 
v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
 Federal prisoners have a liberty interest in statutory good time credits.  Wolff v. 
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1); Vega v. United 
States, 493 F.3d 310, 317 n.4 (3d Cir. 2007).  Accordingly, when a prisoner’s disciplinary 
hearing may result in a loss of good time credits, “the inmate must receive: (1) advance 
written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity . . . to call witnesses and 
present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the 
factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.”  
Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985).  
 When a disciplinary decision relies upon statements from confidential informants, 
minimum due process requires the following: 
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“(1) (T)he record must contain some underlying factual information from 
which the (tribunal) can reasonably conclude that the informant was 
credible or his information reliable; (2) the record must contain the 
informant’s statement (written or as reported) in language that is factual 
rather than conclusionary and must establish by its specificity that the 
informant spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained in such 
statement.” 
 
Helms v. Hewitt, 655 F.2d 487, 502 (3d Cir. 1981) (quoting Gomes v. Travisono, 510 
F.2d 537, 540 (1st Cir. 1974)), rev’d on other grounds, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 
(1983).  “The record” contains both the evidence presented during the disciplinary 
hearing and the investigative report.  Henderson v. Carlson, 812 F.2d 874, 879 (3d Cir. 
1987).  However, “a prison disciplinary committee need not reveal at a disciplinary 
hearing evidence bearing on the reliability of confidential informants if prison officials 
believe that such evidence is capable of revealing the identity of the informants and if the 
evidence is made available to the court for in camera review.”  Id. at 880. 
 The District Court properly dismissed Ancrum’s § 2241 petition.  After our in 
camera review of the record, particularly the Bureau of Prisons’ (“BOP”) investigative 
report, we conclude that the first prong of Helms was met.  Corroboration of witness 
testimony is one indicia of reliability, and three confidential inmate informants presented 
corroborating information regarding Ancrum’s prior heroin sales in prison.  See Mendoza 
v. Miller, 779 F.2d 1287, 1293 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that corroborating testimony can 
establish the reliability of confidential informant testimony).
1
  Furthermore, the BOP 
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 Mendoza noted that the reliability of confidential informants can also be established by: 
  
5 
 
investigative report meets the second prong of Helms.  Each confidential informant 
provided information regarding personal knowledge of Ancrum’s distribution of heroin 
within USP Canaan.  Specifically, the informants described personal purchases of heroin 
from Ancrum and details regarding Ancrum’s methods of receiving and distributing the 
heroin.  Although we agree with the District Court that a better practice would have been 
for the DHO to include a finding of reliability in his decision, we are confident that 
Ancrum received the minimum due process required under Helms. 
 Nevertheless, Ancrum argues that he is entitled to relief because the Magistrate 
Judge explicitly stated that the DHO had not complied with 28 C.F.R. § 541.8(f)(6).  28 
C.F.R. § 541.8(f)(6) states that the “DHO may consider evidence provided by a 
confidential informant (CI) that the DHO finds reliable.”  BOP Program Statement 
5270.08 states that when a DHO bases a disciplinary decision on information gathered 
from confidential informants, the “DHO shall document, ordinarily in the hearing report, 
the finding as to the reliability of each confidential informant relied on and the factual 
basis for that finding.”  While the BOP is required to follow its own regulations, see 
                                                                                                                                                  
(1) the oath of the investigating officer as to the truth of his report 
containing confidential information and his appearance before the 
disciplinary committee . . .; (3) a statement on the record by the chairman 
of the disciplinary committee that he had firsthand knowledge of the 
sources of information and considered them reliable on the basis of their 
past record of credibility. . .; or (4) in camera review of material 
documenting the investigator’s assessment of the credibility of the 
confidential informant. 
 
 779 F.2d at 1293 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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Wilson v. U.S. Parole Com’n, 193 F.3d 195, 200 (3d Cir. 1999), such error is harmless 
because our analysis above assures us that Ancrum received the minimum due process 
required under Helms for using information gathered from confidential informants, see 
Elkin v. Fauver, 969 F.2d 48, 53 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that harmless error analysis 
applies to cases concerning prison disciplinary proceedings). 
For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
